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Abstract
Declining fertility is one of the top policy issues in South Korea. To increase the birth
rate, the government of South Korea has been enacting several fertility encouragement polices.
Although almost all of the birth encouragement policies have been led by the central government,
a childbirth grant program was developed by primary local governments themselves. The grant
levels vary significantly between local governments.
I examine what explains the differences in the childbirth grant level by analyzing twelve
years (2004-2015) of panel data with a fixed-effects model. Prior studies indicate that the extent
of demand for a policy and the availability of financial resources are the main factors influencing
welfare policies of South Korean local governments. From this point of view, my study focuses
on population fluctuation and fiscal capacity of the local governments as the primary explanatory
variables while including several socio-economic and political factors as control variables.
According to my estimation results, population change has a statistically significant
impact on the grant level (generosity of the grants) offered by primary local governments in the
provinces while it has no significant impact in the metropolitan cites. By contrast, the fiscal
capacity has a subtle impact only on the grant levels of the municipalities in the metropolitan
cities. Interestingly, the grant level of nearby local governments has a positive effect both in the
provinces and metropolitan cities.
The results indicate the local governments in the provinces respond more sensitively to
population change regardless of their fiscal capacity. Most provinces have more small
municipalities facing a shrinking population compared to metropolitan cities. While the stated
goal of childbirth grants is increasing births, a competition among local governments not to lose
younger people to nearby local governments contributes to increasing childbirth grants.
This suggests the central government intervene in the childbirth grant policy of local
governments to alleviate financial burden on the small and poor local governments as well as to
increase the birth rate.
3

1. Introduction
South Korea is experiencing a drastic decrease in fertility. The country also takes in few
long-term immigrants. Consequently, its population is aging. Since the 1960s, the birth rate of
South Korea has been on a downward trend. In 2005, it reached the lowest rate among OECD
countries with 1.08 children per woman.
Figure 1.1: Birthrate of South Korea against Average of OECD Countries (1960-2013)
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A declining birth rate and aging population lead to a shrinking labor force. Also, taxes to
support government pensions for the elderly have to increase. Continuing on the same trajectory
will lead to a less vibrant economy. Accordingly, the South Korean government has been
enacting several policies to increase the birth rate. They include tax incentives and daycare
subsidies.
Almost all childbirth encouragement policies have been led by the central government of
South Korea and applied uniformly across the country. There is one exception, however: A
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childbirth grant program was developed by primary local governments (PLG) 1 themselves
without a guideline or financial support from the central government. This unique, bottom-up
grant program was started by two local governments (Ulleung-gun and Hampyeong-gun) in 2002.
Over the next ten years the grant program spread to nearly all primary local governments despite
a controversy about the effectiveness of the grants in increasing the birth rate.
Figure 1.2: Spread of Childbirth Grant Program by Year (2002-2015)
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While most primary local governments now provide childbirth grants, how much they
pay varies significantly. For example, in 2015, the minimum grant for the third child’s birth was
zero, while the maximum was 12,000,000 Korean won (about $11,000). Even within the same
province there can be large disparities: An average grant paid by Pyeongchang-gun was about
ten times larger than that paid by adjacent Hoengseong-gun. What accounts for the differences?
Interest in local government policies has increased steadily in South Korea since local
autonomy was launched in the 1990s (Choi, 2012). Recently, as many media cover childbirth
grant programs and disparities between the grants provided by different municipalities, there is a
1

There are 226 primary local governments in South Korea, 74 PLG in metropolitan cities and 152
in provinces.
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rising interest in the size of childbirth grants. While there are several studies exploring the grant
program’s effectiveness and diffusion phenomenon, there are few studies explaining the
determinants of the generosity of the grants. Considering several issues related with the grants –
inequality, financial burden and ripple effects 2, there is a need to look at the factors influencing
the level of childbirth grants. Therefore, this study examines what causes the differences in
childbirth grants paid out by primary local governments.

2. Literature Review
The childbirth grant program is one of several fertility encouragement policies in South
Korea. The generosity of the grants is determined by primary local governments themselves.
This study will review existing studies about the effectiveness of fertility policies of local
governments and policy diffusion to provide a background on the local childbirth grant program.
Subsequently, previous studies that analyzed the factors affecting local government policies, and
especially social welfare policies, will be reviewed because they might shed some light on why
some local government adopt more generous policies than others.
Effectiveness of Fertility Encouragement Policies
Existing studies about the effectiveness of fertility policies examine whether the birthrate
substantially increases as a result of fertility encouragement policies. Choe (2015) used a fixed –
effects model to analyze the effectiveness of fertility encouragement policies by South Korean
metropolitan municipalities. She found that policies directed towards expanding childcare,
educational service support, maternity and child-care leave had significant effects on birth rate
while financial support such as direct payments to parents for births did not.
2

For example, childbirth grants made up about 50% of the children welfare budget in Cheon-An

city in Chungcheongnam-do province in 2009 (Lee, J., 2009). Increasing childbirth grants means reducing
resources for other programs. Also, the childbirth grant level of a local government affects that of adjacent
local governments. (Lee, S., 2013)
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Findings about the effectiveness of the childbirth grant programs in South Korea vary
between studies depending on sample, time period and analysis model. For instance, the studies
looking at all primary local governments revealed the grant program has a significant impact on
the birth rate of primary local governments (Choi. 2012; Park & Song. 2014). However, the
studies for the local governments in metropolitan cities conclude that the program has no
significant impact on the birth rate (Seok. 2011; Lim. 2012). Table 2.1 shows a systematic
overview of the existing evidence.
Table 2.1: Previous Studies on the Effectiveness of Childbirth Grants in South Korea
Study

Seok.
(2011)

Dependent
variable

Birth rate

Explanatory
variable
Weighted
average grant
multiplied by
childbirth grant
by birth order

Lim.
(2012)

Birth rate

childbirth grants
by birth order

Baek.
(2012)

Birth rate

Childbirth grants
by birth order

Sample &
Time period

Finding

25 PLO (primary
local governments)
in Seoul
metropolitan city.
2005-2009

Fixed-effect

No significant effect of the grant on
birth rate.

74 PLO in 6
Metropolitan cities
and 12 PLO in
Chungcheongbukdo province.
2004-2011

Difference in
Difference,
Fixed effect

No significant effect of the grant on
birth rate in the metropolitan cities.
Marginal effect on the second child
birth in the province.

151 PLO in
provinces.
2008-2010

Ordinary
least
squares

No significant effect of the grant on
birth rate.

Fixed effect,
Instrumental
variable

The increase of the grant by
1,000,000 Korean Won increases
the birth rate of first, second, and
third child by 7.7%, 2.3% and 0.6%,
respectively.

Fixed-effect

If the average of grants increases to
double, the birth rate is expected to
increases by 1.54%.

Fixed-effect

The grants work as a positive
motivation to move for young
women who are more susceptible to
childbirth.

Number of
child births

Childbirth grants
by birth order

213 PLO in
national level.
2002-2011

Park &
Song.
(2014)

Birth rate

Weighted
average
multiplied by
childbirth grant
by birth order

230 PLO in
national level.
2005-2011

Song
& Kim.
(2014)

Migration
of young
women
(20-39
years old)

Weighted
average
multiplied by
childbirth grant
by birth order

230 PLO in
national level.
2005-2011

Choi.
(2012)

Analysis
method
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Policy Diffusion
Policy diffusion refers to a process in which a new policy adopted by a government is
later adopted by other governments resulting in the gradual increase of the number of
governments using that policy (Eystone, 1977). Policy diffusion is also defined as a process in
which a policy choice of one government is influenced by the policy choice made by another
government (Braun & Gilardi, 2006). Such policy diffusion can occur in various policy areas
such as taxation, environment and social welfare. Existing studies on policy diffusion (Braun &
Gilardi, 2006; Shipan & Volden, 2008) present a variety of causes to policy diffusion including
learning, competition, imitative adaptation, and coercion.
In a study that analyzed the diffusion phenomenon of childbirth grant programs of local
governments in South Korea, Lee, J. (2012) stated that the grant programs showed three typical
characteristics of policy diffusion (i.e. following an S-shaped pattern, geographical clustering,
and diversity amid commonality). He also confirmed that a local government’s decision to adopt
the policy was significantly influenced by the number of adjacent local governments that
introduced the policy, birthrate, and the status of fertility policy establishment by the central
government. By contrast, political factors like the election time of a local government have little
influence. In a study by Lee, S., (2013) who analyzed panel data of 219 primary local
governments from 2002 to 2009, results indicated that the most important factors for a local
government to adopt a childbirth grant are the fiscal capacity of a local government and the
economic condition of that region. The study, in particular, showed that the childbirth grant level
of adjacent regions affects how a local government decides the generosity of their own grants.
These two studies, however didn’t consider the locational difference between a large city and a
rural community, which may determine the pattern of policy choices.
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Policy Determinants of Local Governments
As to the determinants of policy, some scholars focus on socio-economic factors while
other scholars put more emphasis on political-administrative factors. Also, there are empirical
studies pointing out the other factors such as an impact of adjacent governments’ policy as one of
the important policy determinants (Lee, C., 2009). Figure 2 shows diverse factors which could
have an impact on a local government policy.
Figure 2: Determinants of a Local Government Policy
Policy of a Local Government

Socio-economic
determinants
population, education,
income, urbanization,
economic condition,
culture, etc.

Political-administrative
determinants

Other determinants

election, competition
among parties,
organizational structure
& capacity, etc.

policy of adjacent local
governments, advocacy
coalition, fiscal ability
incrementalism, etc.

There are some relevant lessons in U.S. studies of policy variation between the states.
V. O. Key’s analysis of Southern politics suggests interparty competition and voting rate of lowincome voters can have a significant impact on the welfare policy of state government. When
there is a keen competition between parties, the policy process becomes more responsive to the
needs of people (V.O.Key, 1949; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2003). Meanwhile, Dye
(1992) concluded that social welfare policy decisions are better explained in terms of economic
development factors rather than political factors after analyzing groups of factors: socioeconomic factors (urbanization, industrialization, income, education), political factors
(dispersion of party control, competition between parties, proportional inequity among resident
representatives), and other factors (public health, social welfare, expressway, etc.).
9

In South Korea, in spite of a relatively short history of local autonomy 3, there are several
studies exploring diverse factors influencing the policy of local government. With respect to
welfare policy determinants of local governments, unlike policy decisions at the national level 4,
the influence of political factors such as election time and competition among parties tend to be
insignificant while socio-economic factors such as population and fiscal capacity were found to
have significant effect on policy decisions by local governments. (Kim, B., 1995; Kang, 2012;
Kim, G., 2013; Lee, S. 2013; Kim, K., 2014, Kim, J. 2015). Table 2.2 summarizes the findings of
these studies.
Table 2.2: Studies on the Determinants of South Korean Local Governments’ Policy
Dependent
variable

Study

Independent & Control Variables

Finding: policy determinants

Expenditure per
capita

Population, population density, aging population
ratio, the rate of recipient of national basic livelihood
guarantees, fiscal independence, tax share per
capita, # of residents per public official, election

Population, fiscal
independence, tax share
per capita, population
density

Kim, G.,
(2013)

Social welfare
budget ratio

Youth population ratio, aging population ratio, child
population ratio, the disabled ratio, the rate of
recipient of national basic livelihood guarantees,
population density, fiscal independence, local tax
per capita, political party of mayor, # of social
welfare regulations

Youth population ratio, fiscal
independence

Kim, K.,
(2014)

Elderly welfare
budget ratio

Aging population ratio, elderly employment rate,
economically active population ratio, GRDP (gross
regional domestic product), GRDP per capita, fiscal
independence, local tax per capita

Elderly population ratio,
fiscal independence

Ko,
(2014)

Health care
budget per capita

Elderly population ratio, the rate of recipient of
national basic livelihood guarantees, local tax
burden per resident, the number of hospital, drinking
rate, smoking rate, suicide rate, type of local
government , political party of mayor

Elderly population ratio,
political party of mayor

Kim, J.,
(2015)

Social welfare
expenditure per
capita

Aging population & child population ratio, population
density, the rate of recipient of national basic
livelihood guarantees, fiscal independence rate,
type of local government , election, political party of
mayor, local tax per capita

Aging population & child
population ratio, fiscal
independence rate

Kim, B.,
(1995)

3

Since 1990s, the election for local governors and mayors has been held in South Korea. Before
the election, the central government appointed the governor and mayor of each local government.
4

In studies on social welfare policies In Korea on national level, it was found that political factors
have significant effect on policy decision (Hwang, 1997; Park, B. 2006).
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As the prior studies indicate, various factors can have effects on the decision making on
local government policies, and the answer to the question of what factors have more effects is
determined variedly based on the detailed contents of policies and the policy-making
environments of each local government. Regarding a social welfare policy of South Korean local
governments, most studies reveal that social factors have more effects on the social welfare
policies than political factors. The policy of a local government can be defined as the means for
addressing a social problem of its region. In this respect, South Korean local governments tend to
react more sensitively to the factors representing the demand for its policy in that the policy is
the means for addressing a social problem of that region.

3. Theoretical Framework
The prior studies I reviewed indicate that the extent of demand for a policy and financial
resources available are the main factors influencing social welfare policies of South Korean local
governments. Population change is a social factor that represents the demand for childbirth
grants. Losing young people means there is a less vibrant economy, there have to be cuts to the
local government, and there will be fewer representatives in the National Assembly 5. Thus, there
is a need for a local government to increase population or at least to stop the outflow of
population by increasing the birth rate or attracting young couples to its region (Song & Kim, H.,
2014).
In addition, as shown in Table 3, local governments in South Korea are financially
dependent on the central government. Many of their projects receive financial support from the
central government. However, there is no subsidy for the childbirth grants. It means that the local
governments have to execute the programs with their own revenues.
5
The size of organization and the number of seats in the National Assembly are determined
based on population of the each primary local government.
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Table 3: Fiscal Independence Rate 6 of South Korean Primary Local Governments
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

Mean
66.8
71.5
69.5
67.4
65.7
65.0
62.3
62.3
62.1
61.3
54.8

Std. Dev.
10.6
8.8
9.3
9.6
10.1
10.9
11.4
10.8
10.6
10.6
10.4

Min
47.0
51.9
45.8
39.6
36.4
33.7
30.8
33.0
32.8
31.9
27.8

Max

93.3
93.9
92.8
91.7
90.4
91.4
91.6
91.8
90.1
90.0
84.6

Source: Korea Statistical Information Service (KOSIS)

My study therefore focuses on population and fiscal independence as the determinants of
childbirth grants. Also, other socio-economic and political factors which seem to have an
influence on the dependent variable will be used as control variables.
Figure 3: Research Framework

Population
The Level of
Childbirth Grants
Fiscal Independency
Other Variables:
adjacent governments’ childbirth grants, inflation,
population density, birth rate, childcare center rate,
marriage rate, divorce rate, political party of mayor,
election period

6

The fiscal independence is an inverse measure of a local government’s dependence of its
budget on the central government, and it is computed as follows:
Fiscal independence rate =

Local tax+other local gov′ t income−municipal bond
Total local government accounting budget

12

x 100

The hypotheses of this study are as follows:
a. “If the population of a local government decreases, the childbirth grants offered by the
government will tend to increase.”
b. “If the fiscal independence rate of a local government increases, the childbirth grants
offered by the governments will tend to increase.”

4. Data and Variables
This study uses twelve years (2004-2015) of panel data on 224 7 primary local
governments in South Korea. I collected the childbirth grants data from each local government
through the Korea Public Information System (KPIS) 8, and double checked odd looking data by
telephone. The other data were collected from the Korea Statistical Information Service (KOSIS),
primary local governments and the Korea National Election Commission (KNEC).
The grant level often varies significantly depending on birth order. Thus, the dependent
variable, childbirth grants, is measured as a weighted average because it is more appropriate to
measure the actual budgetary burden on local governments. The weighted average is calculated
by multiplying childbirth grant by birth order with the component ratio of the number of births
by birth order as the weighted value.
As shown in Figure 4.1, childbirth grants considerably increased over the course of time,
and the grant size increased with birth order. The margin of increase in childbirth grants tends to
increase with birth order. Also the disparity in the grant level between local governments
increased over time.
7

Although there are 226 primary local governments in the South Korea, I exclude two cities:
Chunchoen-si and Changwon-si. This is because Chunchoen-si has never had the childbirth grant policy,
and Chanwon-si was created by merger in 2010.
8

The KPIS is a web-based system (www.open.go.kr) where people can request information from
public organizations.
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Childbirth Grant, Korean Won (1100 KRW ≒ 1 USD)

Figure 4.1: Average Level of Childbirth Grants by Birth Oder and Weighted Average

First Child
Second Child
Third Child
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Year

Interestingly, the grant level of primary local governments (PLG) in provinces is much
higher - about three times than that of metropolitan municipalities.
Figure 4.2: Difference in Weighted Average of Grants between Province and Metropolis
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Figure 4.3 shows the average percentage of births by birth order from 2004 to 2015. The
first child accounted for the largest proportion at 51.8%, while the second child accounted for
38.3% the third onward about 9.9% of the total number of childbirths. Based on the figures, it
was found that about 90% of the total number of childbirths were first and second children.
One of the interesting things is that the families with several children were somewhat more
common in the provinces than metropolitan cities.
Figure 4.3: Average Percentage of Births by Birth Order (2004-2014)
9.9%

First Child
Second Child

51.8%

38.3%

Third Child and Onward

Third and onward
National Average

8.3%

11.3%

39.0%

49.7%

37.4%

Province

54.3%

Metropolis

Source: KOSIS

Explanatory variables are population size and fiscal independence rate of each primary
local government. The fiscal independence rate shows the degree of financial independence of a
local government from the central government.
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Control variables include several socio-economic and political factors such as marriage
rate and political party of the mayor. All of the variables and data sources are as follows.
Table 4: Variables and Data Source
Variables
Dependent
variable

Childbirth grants
Population

Explanatory
variables

Description

Source

Weighted average of childbirth grants in Korean

Local

Won

gov’t

The size of population

KOSIS
www.kosis.kr

Sum of local tax and other income by local
Fiscal independence

government subtracted by outstanding value of

rate

municipal bond, and all divided by total local

KOSIS

government’s annual accounting budget
The grant level of

Weighted average of childbirth grants of the

nearby local

province or metropolitan city to which a

governments

municipality belongs

Inflation rate

Consumer price index

KOSIS

Population density

The number of people per square kilometers

KOSIS

Birth rate

Total fertility rate

KOSIS

Childcare center rate

The number of childcare center per 1,000 people

KOSIS

Marriage rate

The number of marriages per 1,000 people

KOSIS

Divorce rate

The number of divorces per 1,000 people

KOSIS

Political party of

Dummy 1: progressive party

Local

0: the other parties

gov’t

KOSIS

Control
variables

mayor
Election period

Dummy 1: election year or the previous year
0: the other years
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KNEC

5. Analysis and Findings
Analysis Methodology: Fixed Effects Model
The primary aim of this study is to examine the impact of two explanatory variables population size and fiscal independence rate - on local governments’ childbirth grants. Since the
childbirth grant level is set by each local government, the largest source of endogeneity would be
time-invariant factors such as a local preference for larger families and historic or cultural
attractiveness of a city to people which should not vary much over time. To address the potential
endogeneity from time-invariant factors, I use a fixed effects model. If the omitted time-invariant
variables were uncorrelated with the included time-varying covariates, a random effects model
would also be a consistent estimator, and it would be more efficient (Hsiao, 2003). However, for
the reasons I describe above, I suspect that the independent variables are correlated with the
inherent local characteristics. A Hausman test 9 rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation.
Therefore, the fixed effects model is a more robust model choice.
In a basic form, the estimation equation of interest is:
log(Granti,t+1)= αi + β1log(Populi,t-1 ) + β2Indepeni, t + β’3Xi,t + γt + εi,t
where Grant is the weighted average of childbirth grants, Popul is the size of population,
Indepen is fiscal independence rate, X is set of controls, ε is error term, i is each local
government, and t is year. The grant and population variables are logarithms 10 of each value. The
dependent variable is entered as a lead variable, and the population as a lagged variable to take
into account the budgetary process 11 of South Korean local governments.

9

The Hausman test result is attached in Appendix.

10

I transform the variables by log to correct positively skewed distributions.

11

Generally, the decision on the next year budget of a local government is processed from
September to December. Thus, local governments use population statistics of previous year when they
draw the next year budget because several current statistics are not likely to be available at that time.
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Estimation Results
Table 5 summarizes the estimation results for the determinants of primary local
governments (PLG)’ childbirth grants.
Table 5: Estimation Results
Childbirth grant level

Coefficient
(1) Whole PLG

(2) PLG in Province

(3) PLG in Metropolis

Population

-0.698
(0.2228)

-1.462*
(0.0168)

1.555
(0.2701)

Fiscal independence rate

0.0125***
(0.0007)

0.00763
(0.0780)

0.0350***
(0.0003)

Nearby local governments’

0.395***
(0.0000)

0.277***
(0.0000)

0.442***
(0.0000)

Inflation rate

-0.00967
(0.8432)

0.0958
(0.1129)

-0.264*
(0.0249)

Population density

0.201
(0.7448)

0.723
(0.2880)

0.145
(0.9142)

Birth rate

0.0865
(0.4874)

0.0468
(0.6989)

0.299
(0.5659)

Childcare center rate

0.0407***
(0.0000)

0.0426***
(0.0000)

0.0523
(0.0503)

Marriage rate

-0.000142
(0.2094)

-0.000162
(0.1842)

-0.000411
(0.1101)

Divorce rate

-0.0368
(0.5416)

0.000387
(0.9948)

-0.0257
(0.9070)

Political party of mayor

0.0985*
(0.0133)

0.0327
(0.4310)

0.299**
(0.0074)

-0.242*
(0.0483)

-0.166
(0.2502)

-0.384
(0.2728)

N

1802

1317

485

The number of PLG

224

150

74

grant level

(progressive party)
Election period

p-values in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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There are several things to notice. First, as shown in Table 5, population has a statistically
significant impact on the childbirth grant level of primary local governments in the provinces
while it has no significant impact on that of metropolitan municipalities at a 95% confidence
level. If the population of a local government decreases by 1 %, the childbirth grant level is
expected to increase by 1.46% in provincial municipalities. It indicates that the local
governments in provinces are more responsive to the population change. This may due to the fact
that the provinces have more small towns that suffer from a serious depopulation problem.
As described in the literature review, the fiscal independence rate tends to positively
affect social-welfare expenditure of South Korean local governments. However, the fiscal
independence rate has only a subtle impact (coefficient: 0.035) on the grant level just for
metropolitan municipalities. It implies that many primary local governments, especially those in
the provinces, tend to draw the budget for childbirth grants regardless of their fiscal conditions.
One of the interesting things is that the grant level of nearby municipalities has a positive
effect on a primary local government’s grant level both in the provinces and metropolitan cities.
If the grant level of the nearby local governments increases by 1%, the grant level of a local
government is predicted to increase by 0.39%.
Limitation
The fixed effects model implicitly makes a parallel trend assumption. Since the fixed
effects model controls time-invariant unobserved variables like indigenous characteristics of
local governments, this study also assumes that childbirth grants in any two local governments
would have increased at the same rate if those local governments had the same value of the
explanatory and control variables. Potentially, there might be time-varying unobservable factors
which have an impact on the dependent variable and measurement error resulting in biased
19

results. While I assumed that local culture such as preference for lager families is time invariant
factor, there is the possibility that the local culture changes over just a few years. In addition, the
characteristic of a local council which I did not consider in this study, can affect the grants
because the budget of a local government has to be approved by the local council.

6. Conclusion and Recommendation
The aging population and declining birth rate have emerged as one of the top policy
issues in South Korea. To increase the birth rate, the government of South Korea has been
enacting several fertility encouragement polices. Although all the policies have been led by the
central government, a childbirth grant program was initiated and diffused by primary local
governments. However, the grant levels vary significantly between the local governments.
Therefore, my study examined what caused the different in the grants paid out by the
local governments with a focus on population and fiscal independence of the local governments.
I chose a fixed effects model to address the potential endogeneity from time invariant factors.
Population change had a statistically significant impact on the childbirth grant level of
primary local governments in the provinces while it had no significant impact on that of
metropolitan municipalities. By contrast, the fiscal independence rate did not have much impact
on the grant level except a subtle influence on that of metropolitan municipalities. Interestingly,
the grant level of nearby primary local governments has a positive effect on a local government’s
grant level both in the provinces and metropolitan cities.
From the estimation results, we can know that, although the stated goal of childbirth
grants is increasing births, a competition among the local governments not to lose young
population to another nearby local governments contributes to increasing childbirth grants.
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Losing young people means further aging of the population and creates the potential to have
reduced administrative organization, and to lose representation in the national congress. This is
because the size of organization and the number of seats in the national congress is mainly
determined based on population of the primary local government. Unlike metropolitan
municipalities, the majority of local governments in the provinces are small cities and towns. To
some local governments, the dwindling population is serious enough to threaten the very
existence of the local government itself. This suggests why the population change has a
significant impact in the provinces.
There is a need for the central government of South Korea to intervene in the childbirth
grant policies of primary local governments in the perspective of pursing balanced regional
development as well as increasing the birth rate. The primary local governments experiencing
depopulation tend to be municipalities having relatively larger rural areas because people,
especially young people, are likely to leave for metropolitan cities looking for jobs or better
living conditions. Also, the fiscal capacity of a small city tends to be weaker compared to those
of big cities having lager urban areas. It means that the local government having lower
population growth is easily tempted to increase the grants in order to prevent the population
outflow even though its fiscal conditions is not good. Therefore, to alleviate financial burden on
small local governments, I recommend the central government introduce differential matching
funds for childbirth grants depending on the characteristics of the primary local governments
such as population size and fiscal capacity.
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Appendix
a. Summary Statistics of Childbirth Grants

Year

Weighted Ave.

First Child

Unit: thousand Korean Won (1100 KRW ≒ 1 USD)

Second Child

Third Child

Fourth Child

Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.

2005

268

188

167

216

247

841

627

841

695

1,063

2006

292

180

139

273

267

1,479

833

1,479

850

1,564

2007

433

246

166

463

391

1,798

1,384

1,798

1,490

2,104

2008

435

290

182

474

400

1,706

1,437

1,706

1,495

1,958

2009

487

360

195

952

496

1,860

1,534

1,860

1,704

2,293

2010

511

406

214

630

500

2,046

1,655

2,046

1,909

2,554

2011

597

420

226

697

576

2,136

1,845

2,136

2,201

2,695

2012

667

471

244

792

674

2,169

1,985

2,169

2,411

2,838

2013

687

475

250

809

704

2,310

2,114

2,310

2,558

2,946

2014

692

474

251

807

707

2,303

2,123

2,303

2,635

2,997

2015

722

490

275

872

732

2,337

2,177

2,337

2,720

3,087

Source: Data collected from primary local governments

b. Hausman Test
Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2

Prob>chi2

Whole PLG

26.37

0.0033

PLG in Province

22.30

0.0136

PLG in Metropolis

36.06

0.0001
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